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ABSTRACT: In this article, I argue for historical epistemology as a methodology for critical 
disability studies (DS) by examining Foucault’s archaeology of cure in History of Madness. 
Although the moral, medical, and social models of disability frame disability history as an 
advancement upon moral and medical authority and a replacement of it by sociopolitical 
knowledge, I argue that the more comprehensive frame in which these models circulate—
the “models framework”—requires the more nuanced approach that historical 
epistemology offers. In particular, the models framework requires greater use of 
epistemology as an analytical tool for understanding the historical construction of 
disability. Thus, I turn to Foucault’s History of Madness in order to both excavate one 
particular archaeological strand in the text—the archaeology of cure—and to demonstrate 
how this narrative disrupts some of the key assumptions of the models framework, 
challenging DS to consider the epistemological force of non-medical fields of knowledge for 
framing disability and procedures for its cure and elimination. I conclude by arguing that 
DS must develop historical epistemological methodologies that are sensitive to the complex 
overlays of moral, medical, and social knowledge, as well as attend to the social 
construction of scientific and biomedical knowledge itself. 
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Introduction  
In a 1974 lecture entitled “The Crisis of Modern Medicine or the Crisis of Antimedicine”, 
Foucault frames the epistemological stakes of twentieth-century anti-medical politics, 
particularly those erupting in the 1960s and 1970s.1 These politics, which included advocacy 
of de-institutionalization, women’s health, and disability rights, marked, for Foucault, a 
shift from the judgment of medicine as pseudoscience to claims that “medicine could be 
                                                          
Acknowledgements: Sincere thanks to Shelley Tremain and Lynne Huffer for comments and 
suggestions on an earlier version of the article, and to Ronald Mendoza for assistance with translation.  
1 Michel Foucault, “The Crisis of Modern Medicine or the Crisis of Antimedicine”, translated by Edgar C. 
Knowlton, Jr., William J. King, and Clare O’Farrell, Foucault Studies, vol. 1 (2004), 5-19. 
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dangerous, not through its ignorance and falseness, but through its knowledge, precisely 
because it was a science.”2 In other words, critics of biomedicine in the civil rights 
movement era understood medical diagnosis and cure as potentially harmful because of the 
dangers of their epistemological claims to positivism and scientificity—a term that Foucault 
used to denote the association of a phenomena with scientific propositions of truth—rather 
than because biomedicine failed to adequately access the truth of the body.3 Twentieth-
century scholarly critiques of scientificity from writers such as Foucault thus emerged in 
parallel to the work of social movements that contested the epistemic authority and control 
of biomedicine. Against this backdrop, the critical field of disability studies (hereafter 
referred to as DS) emerged to contest the “ideology of the cure”,4 that is, to contest the ways 
that medical “cure” operates polemically in order to devalue and enforce the compulsory 
normalization of disabled bodies. 
Critiques of Western biomedicine and science advanced in DS—critiques that 
emerged from disabled people’s challenges to the ideology of the cure—have yielded what 
I call the models framework, a term that I have introduced to refer to the overarching 
analytical and social schema that consists of the moral, medical, and social models of 
disability. According to this schema, the ways in which disability has been known, valued, 
and de-valued have been subject to historical shifts from moral beliefs about disability as 
evidence of a sinful soul (the moral model), to disability as subject to the medical diagnosis 
and classification of supposedly abnormal bodies (the medical model), and finally to the 
notion that disability is best classified as a product of a discriminatory society and social 
order (the social model).5 Initially articulated in British disability studies, these historical 
and epistemological models have yielded additional minority, cultural, and political-
relational models of disability in other geo-political contexts, models that build upon the 
precursor social model in order to elaborate disability as a source of cultural production, 
                                                          
2 Ibid., 9. 
3 Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, translated by A.M. Sheridan 
Smith (New York: Vintage Books, [1972] 2010), 186-187. 
4 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, “Integrating Disability, Transforming Feminist Theory”, NWSA Journal, 
vol. 14 (2002), 1. 
5 This account of the models is ubiquitous in disability studies scholarship, though articulated in some 
varying ways. See Rhoda Olkin, What Psychotherapists Should Know About Disability (New York: Guilford 
Press, 1999), 25-26; Jackie Leach Scully, “A Postmodern Disorder: Moral Encounters with Molecular 
Models of Disability”, in Mairian Corker and Tom Shakespeare (eds.), Disability/Postmodernity (New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2002), 48-50; Eli Clare, Exile and Pride: Disability, Queerness, & Liberation (New 
York: South End Press, 2009), 97; Victoria Ann Lewis, “The Dramaturgy of Disability”, Points of Contact: 
Disability, Art, and Culture (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Ann M. Fox, “How to Crip 
the Undergraduate Classroom: Lessons from Performance, Pedagogy, and Possibility”, Journal of 
Postsecondary Education and Disability, vol. 23 (2010), 40-41; Nandini Ghosh, “Disabled Definitions, 
Impaired Politics: Reflections on Limits of Dominant Concepts of Disability”, Institute of Development 
Studies Kolkata (May, 2012). Available at: http://idsk.edu.in/common/file/OP-34.pdf. 
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political identity, and coalition-building.6 What unites the social, cultural, and political-
relational models of disability, in all of their materialist and poststructuralist iterations, is 
their ethical and epistemological opposition to the medical model. That is, scholars who 
articulate and use the models framework problematise or reject scientific knowledge, often 
turning to Foucault and others to ground their understandings of the historical, social, and 
discursive construction of disability. Thus, we can characterise the social, cultural, political-
relational, and other disability-positive positions as post-positivist models of disability, the 
central epistemological features of which are the rejection of unproblematised or ahistorical 
biomedical and scientific claims and the foregrounding of minority embodiments (such as 
disability) as the basis of situated knowledge,7 two epistemological positions that underlie 
the notion that disability is a social construct, as well as a cultural and political resource.  
The ethical stakes of opposition to biomedical knowledge have been made 
abundantly clear by DS work on the dangers of social exclusion, violent institutionalisation, 
and eugenics.8 I want to point out, however, that although debates are ongoing with respect 
to which model best reflects the reality of disability, the models framework itself is rarely 
theorised as an epistemic apparatus that the field of DS constructs—that is, as an epistemic 
apparatus that itself makes truth claims about disability histories and epistemologies. 
Furthermore, the epistemological nuances of the post-positivist approaches to disability are 
rarely explored, with the exception of the ontologising effects of positivist epistemic 
regimes upon disabled bodies. What is missing, I contend, is a broader understanding of 
the epistemological status of knowledge-claims about disability that, for historical reasons, 
may not always be intelligible as science or positivity. In their omission of this kind of 
analysis from the DS models framework, DS scholars have missed important opportunities 
to build the capacity of DS as a field that does a range of epistemological work, a range of 
work that should include the construction of broad histories of epistemological conceptions 
of disability that go beyond articulations of situated knowledge, in addition to the 
articulation of situated knowledges themselves. In particular, the DS notion of an ideology 
of cure could benefit from the sort of understanding that French historian and 
epistemologist Georges Canguilhem elaborates according to which “Ideology is an 
                                                          
6 Tobin Siebers, Disability Theory (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2008); Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson, “Seeing the Disabled: Visual Rhetorics of Disability in Popular Photography”, in Paul 
Longmore and Lauri Umansky (eds.), The New Disability History (New York: NYU Press, 2000); David 
Mitchell, and Sharon Snyder, Cultural Locations of Disability (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2006); Alison Kafer, Feminist Queer Crip (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013). 
7 Tobin Siebers, Disability Aesthetics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 282. 
8 See for instance, Susan Burch, and Hannah Joiner, Unspeakable: The Story of Junius Wilson (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Lennard Davis, Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the 
Body (New York: Verso, 1995); Mitchell, and Snyder, Cultural Locations of Disability; Susan Schweik, The 
Ugly Laws: Disability in Public (New York: NYU Press, 2010).  
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epistemological concept with a polemical function, applied to systems of representation 
that express themselves in the languages of politics, ethics, religion, and metaphysics.”9  
In this article, I lay out a methodological and historiographical framework for what I 
call the historical epistemology of disability. This framework, which is indebted to the “first 
wave” of DS work on Foucault that was published a decade ago,10 places the models 
framework within broader conversations in the history and philosophy of science in order 
to foreground the constructed, contested, and contingent nature of systems of knowledge 
about disability. I argue for historical epistemological analyses of disability that are 
modeled upon Foucault’s archaeological method. Rather than characterise historical 
epistemology as absent from DS, I show that DS scholars have engaged with disability 
history and epistemology by relying upon Foucault’s later genealogical, biopolitical, and 
ethical works. I take methodological cues from historians of science in order to explore the 
crucial contributions that a turn to Foucault’s earlier archaeological methodology makes to 
the historical epistemology of disability.11 Then, I turn to Foucault’s History of Madness to 
illustrate what an historical epistemology or archaeology of the concept of cure can do to 
increase the sensitivity of the models framework to the complexity of moral, medical, and 
social knowledge about disability.12 
 
Historical Epistemology as a Critical Methodology  
Historical epistemology is a concept that historians of science have elaborated in order to 
describe the combined efforts of history and epistemology; that is, historical epistemology 
describes work that historicises epistemic concepts, epistemic objects, and the long-term 
trajectories of research practices.13 Historical epistemology makes two basic assumptions: 
                                                          
9 Georges Canguilhem, Ideology and Rationality in the History of the Life Sciences, translated by Arthur 
Goldhammer (Cambridge: MIT Press), 29. 
10 See Shelley Tremain, (ed.) Foucault and the Government of Disability (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2005). The first volume of the collection was divided into the sections of “Epistemologies and 
Ontologies”, “Histories”, “Governmentality”, and “Ethics and Politics”. In this article, I present a 
methodological reading that explicitly spans these already-entangled categories to reveal a new model for 
DS thinking about historical power-knowledge, that is, a methodological reading that embeds my 
arguments in each of the categories. 
11 I am essentially arguing for an approach to DS that operates more closely in the mode of historians and 
philosophers of science and feminist epistemologists in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries 
(after Foucault, Canguilhem, and others) to not simply dismiss scientific and medical knowledge for 
making claims to positivity and scientificity, but rather to engage with such claims and the broader 
systems of discourse they construct around the body and difference. DS has made limited forays into 
science studies, particularly because of the perception of history of medicine and history of science as 
operating within a deficit framework of disability. However, I argue here that DS would greatly benefit 
from some of the methodological and historiographical innovations of historians of science in particular. 
12 Michel Foucault, History of Madness, edited by Jean Khalfa, and translated by Jonathan Murphy (Oxon: 
Routledge, [1961] 2006). 
13 For an overview of approaches to historical epistemology, see Uljana Feest and Thomas Sturm, “What 
(Good) is Historical Epistemology?”, Erkenn, vol. 75 (2011), 285–302. As Feest and Sturm point out, 
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First, epistemologies are products of the specific historical contexts from within which they 
emerge; and second, historical accounts of epistemic phenomena should incorporate the 
tools and concepts of epistemology in order to understand how objects of inquiry become 
objectified, how standards of evidence are formed and by whom, and how historically-
specific epistemological, political, and institutional discourses produce these intelligibilities. 
An additional, implicit, assumption of this post-positivist approach is that discussions of 
ontology, politics, and ethics can become accessible through an epistemological lens that 
historicises and contextualises adequately and appropriately.14 This additional third 
assumption echoes Foucault’s own insistence that the archaeological works that he devoted 
to mapping epistemes and dispositifs (grids of intelligibility) were ostensibly about both 
power and knowledge, differently articulated.15  
Historical epistemologists, although they look to figures such as Canguilhem, 
Ludwik Fleck, and Thomas Kuhn,16 tend to take heavy methodological and 
historiographical cues from Foucault, paying particular attention to his archaeological 
methods, rather than his later genealogical and ethical work.17 Whereas traditional 
approaches to the history of science focus on causality and authorship in a deterministic 
way, and whereas epistemology within analytic philosophy often operates within a logical 
positivist framework that presumes the historical and political neutrality of notions of truth 
and objectivity,18 Foucauldian archaeology considers the historical, disjointed, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
historical epistemology is “the guiding idea of the kind of research pursued at the Max Planck Institute 
for the History of Science in Berlin”, but also describes the work of other historians and theorists. For a 
history of attempts to historicize epistemology in philosophy and history, see Hans-Jorge Rheinberger, 
On Historicizing Epistemology: An Essay (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). My reference to 
historical epistemology refers to the specific epistemic community of historians and philosophers of 
science articulating it as such, rather than other elaborations of archaeology as a philosophical method 
comparable to phenomenology. For the latter, see Elizabeth Basso, “On Historicity and Transcendentality 
Again. Foucault’s Trajectory from Existential Psychiatry to Historical Epistemology”, Foucault Studies, vol. 
14 (2012), 154-178. 
14 Although this point seems antithetical to the practice of epistemology, particularly in analytic 
philosophy, historian of philosophy John Zammito has argued that these connections are even present 
within 20th century logical positivism. See John Zammito, A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post-positivism 
in the Study of Science from Quine to Latour (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 9. Also see Helen 
Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990) for the argument for the entanglement of scientific standards of objectivity with 
social determinations of epistemic validity. 
15 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power”, in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 115. 
16 Rheinberger, On Historicizing Epistemology. 
17 Archaeology is not only an historical method, but also one with great significance for philosophical 
studies of knowledge. See Bregham Dalgliesh, “Critical History: Foucault after Kant and Nietzsche”, 
Parrhesia, vol. 18 (2013), 68-84; Arnold Davidson, The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the 
Formation of Concepts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Ian Hacking, “Two Kinds of ‘New 
Historicism’ for Philosophers”, New Literary History, vol. 21 (1990), 343-364. 
18 Longino, Science as Social Knowledge, 32. 
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accumulated formation of rules of knowledge and the conditions of possibility for the 
emergence of knowledge. As such, archaeology is a kind of second-order analysis of formal, 
ahistorical epistemological foundations, discourses, and terms of validity, as well as 
medical, scientific, and juridical systems of classification and their interfaces with societal 
discourses.19 Archaeology shifts into intelligibility the conditions of possibility for what is 
understood as valid scientific knowledge by asking:  
 
on what basis knowledge and theory became possible; within what space of order 
knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori, and in the element of 
what positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in 
philosophies, rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon 
afterwards.20 
 
For Foucault, authority, objectivity, empiricism, rationality, logic, and reason are not 
ahistorical epistemic standards, but rather are historically-constituted concepts. These 
concepts, which are crucial points of inquiry for historians and philosophers of science, may 
appear to have little bearing on other fields, such as DS. For instance, a number of scholars 
in fields such as feminist studies and DS have characterised archaeology as archaic. As 
feminist philosopher Amy Allen puts it, Foucault’s archaeological works seem to consist of 
“austere discussions of discursive formations, archives, and epistemes that are rather more 
difficult to connect with” the concerns of feminist scholars or of disability studies scholars.21 
I want to point out, however, that systems of knowledge recognisable as science—which 
Foucault describes using terms such as connaissance and scientificity—are not the sole focus 
of archaeology. On the contrary, archaeology apprehends the assumptions and values that 
circulate around forms of knowledge that are unrecognisable as science—forms of 
knowledge that are nonetheless organised in epistemological systems, the effects of which 
become articulated upon bodies often characterised as marginal or deviant.  
In addition, archaeology excavates discourses and games of truth that constitute 
knowledge below the thresholds of formal, positive, scientific authority (the type of 
knowledge that Foucault calls savoir). As an alternative to historical narratives of 
progressive and linear events of scientific discovery, Foucault characterises epistemic shifts 
through the unfolding of, and passage through, thresholds of epistemic emergence: 
“concentric circles” or thresholds for mapping the status of truth claims.22 Scientific 
authority emerges not as a single, saturated hue, but rather as a gradient of claims to 
objectivity, or the thresholds of positivity, epistemologisation, scientificity, and 
                                                          
19 Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 127-28. 
20 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, translated by Alan Sheridan 
(New York: Vintage Books, [1970] 1994), xxi-xxii. 
21 Amy Allen, “Feminism, Foucault, and the Critique of Reason: Re-reading the History of Madness”, 
Foucault Studies, vol. 16 (2013), 16. 
22 Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 114. 
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formalisation.23 These thresholds refer, respectively, to the possibility of truth-statements, 
standards of validity, propositions of truth, and formal disciplines. This nuanced gradient 
of truth-claims grants descriptive precision to post-positivist critiques of epistemic 
authority, allowing historical epistemologists to avoid the wholesale dismissal of scientific 
authority as false empiricism or over-determined rationality and providing more precisely-
calibrated language for the evaluation of the status of truth-claims below the thresholds that 
formal scientific regimes establish. As Foucault clarifies, archaeology “grant[s] the existence 
of domains of knowledge that were not exactly identifiable with sciences yet were not just 
mental habits either.”24 For the archaeological method,  
 
the important thing is to determine what transformation must have been carried out prior to 
[the birth of a science], around [this birth], or in [this birth] for a knowledge to be able to take 
on the status and function of a science. In short, this is the theoretical problem of the 
constitution of a science when one aims to analyze it not in transcendental terms but in terms 
of history.25 
 
In this article, I foreground Foucault’s historical epistemological concepts of thresholds and 
conditions of possibility in order to elaborate the ways that thinking with and through 
archaeology (as a method) could provide the historical and epistemological scholarship of 
DS with a means by which to organise itself as a field, identify the status of its truth-claims, 
and re-organise its orientations toward scientific and medical thought.  
In order to apprehend cure and ability as both ideologies and historical practices, it 
is useful to approach their constructedness through an understanding of the 
epistemological workings of ideology and power that is as nuanced as possible. In a 
reference to Canguilhem’s epistemologisation of ideology (quoted above), Foucault writes 
in The Archaeology of Knowledge that ideology, “is not exclusive of scientificity. Few 
discourses have given so much place to ideology as clinical discourse: […] that is not a 
sufficiently good reason to treat the totality of their statements as being undermined by 
error, contradiction, and a lack of objectivity.”26 I draw upon Foucault’s insights in this 
regard in order to argue against the prevailing tendency within DS to categorise certain 
types of thought as ideologically “medical” or “scientific” (and thus dismissible or 
unimportant), absent any attempt to understand the historical constitution of these 
categories and their persistence within ways of thinking and knowing disability, especially 
ways of thinking and knowing that appear as (among other things) “non-scientific”, 
“religious”, “superstitious”, and “social.” To put it another way, the models framework 
needs a methodological approach that allows it to trace the persistence of standards of 
knowledge, practices of treatment, and so forth within discourses that are below the 
                                                          
23 Ibid., 186-7. 
24 Michel Foucault, “Candidacy Presentation, College de France, 1969”, in Paul Rabinow (ed.), Ethics: 
Subjectivity and Truth (New York: The New Press, 1994), 6. 
25 Ibid., 8. 
26 Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 186. 
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thresholds of positivity, epistemologisation, scientificity, and formalisation. The stakes of 
these methodological points are fairly high, insofar as methodology shapes the contours of 
DS’s ethical encounters with knowledge. Consider, for instance, philosopher of science John 
Zammito’s reminder that “it is essential that we resist the tendency to identify empirical 
inquiry generally with positivism”27 and recent work in feminist science studies by 
Elizabeth Wilson and Karen Barad, who argue that feminists should attend to the 
contributions that techno-science can make to thinking about epistemology, ontology, and 
ethics, rather than reject techno-scientific claims outright.28 In a similar vein, the explanatory 
power of historical epistemology—modeled after an archaeological method—lies in its 
ability to both trace the material effects of knowledge upon bodies, techniques, and 
systems, and analyse the systems and formations of knowledge (savoir) that make bodies 
intelligible.  
  
Historical Epistemologies of Disability 
In this section, I trace the ways that the models framework has emerged as a set of historical 
and epistemological claims within the field of DS and distinguish the particular types of 
claims that are, therefore, at work in the field. In other words, I map the epistemic claims 
and tendencies of the models framework in order to understand how DS epistemology has 
formed in accordance with certain theories of what constitutes medical practice, scientific 
knowledge, and minority knowledges. Then, I identify how these discourses have 
produced the particular type of thinking that underlies the models framework, engaging in 
some places with Foucault’s texts in order to so. In so doing, I outline some of the ways that 
the models framework has kept DS thinking within certain epistemic framings and, 
furthermore, has precluded archaeological investigations of the circulation of certain 
epistemic concepts and practices. My purpose in the section is not to prescribe one mode of 
historical or epistemological study over another or to characterise existing DS work on 
Foucault as somehow deficient, but rather to map the ways that such work occurs within 
the field and how additional alternative methodologies—namely, archaeology and 
historical epistemology—contribute an additional level of theoretical analysis about 
disability as a phenomenon of power-knowledge.  
What kind of historical and epistemological framework is the models framework? 
On the surface, the models framework appears to be what philosopher of science Ian 
Hacking, following Foucault, refers to as “historical ontology”,29 insofar as the models 
                                                          
27 Zammito, A Nice Derangement of Epistemes, 6. 
28 Elizabeth Wilson, Psychosomatic: Feminism and the Neurological Body (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2004); Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).  
29 Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Hacking takes this term 
from Foucault, who uses it to describe “the structure of genealogical interpretation” (Michel Foucault, 
“On the Genealogy of Ethics”, in Paul Rabinow (ed.), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (New York: The New 
Press, 1994c), 262-263). I maintain that historical ontology and historical epistemology are different, albeit 
equally useful, methodologies. 
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framework suggests that historical shifts in the ontology of disability reflect broader 
discourses and regimes of knowledge that make disability intelligible, knowable, and 
sayable. Rather than operate as archaeology, however, the models framework proceeds in a 
manner more typical of what Foucault characterizes as the mainstream history of ideas or 
concepts, which traces the emergence of concepts through regular intervals of transition, 
though not necessarily through an epistemological lens that maps an entire field of 
knowledge.30 Most epistemological work in DS problematizes medical model claims,31 
shows the construction of scientific knowledge within particular cases of biopolitics,32 
introduces situated knowledge concepts,33 or explores aspects of moral knowledge.34 
Methodologically, most of these investigations do not operate on the scale of broader fields 
of knowledge or historicise epistemological concepts across long timeframes. Nevertheless, 
we can observe the historical epistemologies that the models framework implies by 
mapping the topics and positions that scholars are willing to study and how their methods 
for doing so contribute to what Hans-Jorge Rheinberger calls “the production of a habit of 
perception.”35  
What, then, are the habits of perception to which DS is attached? To begin, historical 
scholarship that has developed the models framework has been overwhelmingly focused 
on the medical model, particularly the shift between nineteenth-century constructions of 
the body (via medicine and eugenics) and twentieth-century regimes of rehabilitation, 
institutionalisation, disability culture, and finally identity politics, or on the social model 
and disability history. As British sociologist of disability Tom Shakespeare has argued, 
critiques of the medical model comprise one of the defining polemics that the DS fields 
deploys, whereby the accusation that a particular line of thought borders on the “medical 
model” often serves as an epistemic disqualifier.36 Notably, the moral model is less often 
deployed polemically, though usually appears as a straw-person concept in DS elaborations 
of the models framework. DS scholars have largely taken for granted the period to which 
they assign the moral model and devote very little attention to its historical basis. When 
scholars do discuss the moral model at all, they largely confine it to a pre-scientific, pre-
objective, and non-epistemic historical space of superstition, rather than take it seriously as 
an epistemological framing of the body, difference, and health. For instance, disability 
bioethicist Jackie Leach Scully argues that the nineteenth-century statistical quantification of 
deviation—an epistemic practice associated with positivism—is responsible for the shift 
from a moral model of disability designed to rebalance the humours to a medical model 
                                                          
30 Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 183. 
31 Mitchell, and Sharon Snyder, Cultural Locations of Disability. 
32 Shelley Tremain, “Biopower, Styles of Reasoning, and What’s Missing from the Stem Cell Debates”, 
Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, vol. 25 (2010), 577-609 
33 Garland-Thomson, “Integrating Disability, Transforming Feminist Theory”, 21. 
34 Jackie Leach Scully, Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference (Lantham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2008), 44-45. 
35 Rheinberger, On Historicizing Epistemology, 30. 
36 Tom Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 18. 
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that performs cures.37 This historical narrative takes two things for granted: first, that the 
system of knowledge around humourist medicine is non-scientific; and second, that the 
relationship between medicalisation and positivism is a natural emergence, rather than a 
relationship that appears through epistemic shifts and practices that pre-date, and do not 
behave as, medical positivities—a history that, as I shall explain, Foucault traces in History 
of Madness.  
The second habit of perception to which DS seems attached speaks to its 
understanding of historical time. DS, in its critical framing of pathologisation, treats the 
medical model as a progressive break from the moral association of disability with sin, 
albeit a progression with its own set of problems. By “progression”, I do not mean to 
suggest that this break was a positive advancement, but rather that DS represents this shift 
as a teleological change from one schema to another. Disability theorist Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson aptly describes this shift in schemas in the way that DS typically characterises it: 
 
disability has been almost entirely subsumed in twentieth-century America under a medical 
model that pathologizes disability. Although medical interpretation rescues disability from 
its earlier associations with evil, pathologized difference is fraught with assumptions of 
deviance, patronizing relationships, and issues of control.38 
 
In this narrative of historical progress, the medical episteme “rescues”, erases, and 
supplants moral conceptions of disability that associate it with sin. The models framework, 
despite adopting a teleological stance toward science and biomedicine, does little to explain 
the varied and heterogeneous effects of the moral model on later historical periods. We are 
left to wonder what occurs to the remnants of the moral model that remain after the rupture 
of its hegemony.  
Whereas Garland-Thomson’s historical claim is part of a larger canonical study of 
theories and concepts of disability within a literary frame, more explicitly historical 
scholarship in DS further clarifies my point about the erasure of the moral model. Within 
the models framework, the moral model is represented as the trace of a distant, pre-
scientific past when religious beliefs and superstitions about disability produced an 
undesirable moralization of difference. The transition to the medical model is historicised 
and claimed to occur between the Middle Ages and the Age of Reason, a claim that takes 
for granted the association between Enlightenment thinking and objectivity. French 
historian of disability Henri-Jacques Stiker’s History of Disability provides a foundational 
example.39 In this text, Stiker explores the notion of disability as difference since antiquity, 
                                                          
37 Scully, “A Postmodern Disorder”, 48-50. 
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clarifying that he focuses on physical disability as a remedy for the gap that Foucault’s 
focus on madness left.40 According to Stiker,  
 
In the Middle Ages, we have seen, people spoke lightly of monsters and monstrosity without 
having seen them. It was an imaginary world. Even in the case of major human deformities, 
people recounted incidents that were never verified. And this lore was passed on for 
generations. Then medical thought of a more scientific kind makes its appearance. Like Paré, 
it breaks with the idea of demonic visitation and curses in order to seek the origins of 
deformity.41 
 
Notably, Stiker’s notion of a “break” is as much an epistemological break from belief in 
monsters as it is an ontological break. Stiker locates the birth of scientificity around physical 
disability in the science of heredity, which charts aberrance and defect in ways that depart 
from the view that disability “originate[s] with the Creator.”42 This epistemological turn is 
due to a clear shift from religious thinking to Enlightenment thinking in the classical age, 
when suddenly “there is no longer a divine order”,43 but rather a “sharper scientific 
focus.”44 Although later in his text Stiker notes the parallel between doctors and priests as 
agents with power,45 his focus is not the epistemological relation between moral and 
medical understandings of disability, but rather the progressive emergence of the medical 
model as a way in which difference becomes consolidated. This point speaks to method. 
From the outset, Stiker is explicit that The History of Disability “is less an archaeology of 
knowledge […] than a semiotics of cultures. That is, my interest is in the perception of 
cultural universes more than in the problems of knowing and doing.”46 Stiker sets up the 
moral history of disability and the “break” that produces positive medicine as evidence of 
an emerging regime of scientificity that produces the nineteenth-century practice of cure 
and the twentieth-century regimes of rehabilitation and enhancement. The progress 
narrative about a shift from medical to social and post-positivist thinking underlies DS’s 
justification of itself as a discipline, or what, following Foucault, we could call its “threshold 
of formalization.”  
DS’s positions on scientificity and temporality bring us to the third of the models 
framework’s habits of perception: epistemologically, DS understands science, medicine, 
and biology as value-laden (and explicitly ideological) phenomena that frame medicine’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
disability in Western history, turning to the archive to “analyze a whole epistemology, a whole period” 
(Henri-Jacques Stiker, “Cathy Kudlick Interviews Henri-Jacques Stiker - Part One”, Disability History 
Association Newsletter (Spring, 2009). Available at: 
http://www.dishist.org/news/Spring09/spring2009.html.). 
40 Stiker, A History of Disability, 19, and 92. 
41 Ibid., 92. 
42 Ibid., 93-4. 
43 Ibid., 103. 
44 Ibid., 104. 
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epistemic authority and the relations between doctors and patients. This understanding, as 
I noted in my introduction, is part of a larger trajectory of social movement rejections of 
biomedicine. DS scholars David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder elucidate this critique when 
they characterise “medical labels as themselves fuzzy, historical, and often stigmatizing 
artifacts of biology and cognition as social constructs.”47 They maintain that research on and 
about disabled people carries the biases of the medical gaze, namely that disability results 
in disadvantage or lack, and maintains “subject/object divisions.”48 This division renders 
disabled bodies as  
 
available for excessive experimentation and bureaucratic oversight. […] From this 
perspective, research feeds the insatiable gristmill of science while also fortifying our ideas 
of disability as a curiosity that invites the most prurient forms of speculation parading as 
empiricism.49 
 
Notice that this characterisation merges the two understandings of medicalisation—that is, 
medicalisation as both pseudoscientific and marked by dangerous scientificity—that 
Foucault described. Mitchell and Snyder’s point is not, however, merely a claim about bias 
or medicine as pseudoscience, nor about the dangers of scientificity alone. Rather, it is also 
a claim about epistemic authority. More recent articulations of “critical realist” 
epistemologies within DS have maintained this post-positivist orientation, although they 
have foregrounded and emphasised the lived experiences of disability.50 Other DS scholars 
have argued that biomedical discourses produce epistemic injustice for disabled people, 
denying the value of their situated knowledge about disability.51 Accordingly, the models 
framework sets up the social and cultural models of disability as interventions in the 
ableism of societal institutions, structures, and attitudes that precipitate alternative forms of 
knowledge-production, such as sitpoint theories and situated knowledges, or social 
scientific studies of disability from a post-positivist lens. We can understand these situated 
knowledges as DS’s thresholds of positivity and epistemologisation and the theoretical 
bases from which it is possible to make truth-claims about disability and establish 
standards for their validity.52   
Beyond questions of epistemic authority and situated knowledge, the models 
framework is decidedly post-positivist in the way that it critiques cure and ability. The 
                                                          
47 Mitchell, and Sharon Snyder, Cultural Locations of Disability, 10. 
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threshold of epistemologisation of the models framework thus operates around this 
orientation toward the epistemic force of medical cure. According to DS theorist Tobin 
Siebers,   
 
The medical model thrives by sustaining an essential difference between nondisabled and 
disabled people, defining disability not as a flourishing of biological diversity but as an 
individual defect that professionals cure or eradicate in order to restore a person to the 
superior state of health required by the ideology of ability.53  
 
This claim about the present state of the medical model represents a taken-for-grantedness 
of the status of medicine itself, according to which it always dwells in positivities. Such 
claims solidify the status of medical objectivity, without considering the ways that notions 
of “biological diversity”, “superior state of health”, and even “ability”, though certainly 
ideological, are constructions of shifting histories of scientific and medical thinking. Within 
the models framework, modern medicine and biomedical research, operating through a 
positivist epistemology, appear to be uniquely responsible for the ideology of the cure. For 
instance, Robert McRuer’s concept of “compulsory able-bodiedness” references the 
compulsion toward correction, cure, and rehabilitation in a normalising society organised 
around the medical model and finds commonalities between the disability and queer 
experiences of medical institutionalization.54 Disability theorists focus, nonetheless, on the 
elaboration of positivism as an ideology that works within knowledge production about 
disability, in addition to their interest in post-positivist critiques of the ideologies of cure 
and ability in society. As Michael Oliver, one of the originators of the social model, puts it,  
 
Health research about impairment and disability is dominated by positivist theories. It 
focuses on searches for cures, means of reducing impairments, or assessments of clinical 
interventions and uses methods such as controlled trials, random statistical samples, and 
structured questionnaires.55 
 
Post-positivist assumptions (without a perspective on the history of science) thus underlie 
DS’s critiques of norms and normalisation—criticisms that are as field-defining as the 
models framework itself. Yet, many DS historical accounts focus on the elaboration of the 
positivities of particular points in history, rather than study the shifts and ruptures that the 
models framework as a whole implies. Although Siebers and Oliver take a presentist 
position, other DS scholars’ historical accounts of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
medicine and statistics mark the emergence of the ideology of the cure and the statistical 
framing of the norm as a form of positivity, or in any case as an epistemic object that can be 
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verified statistically and through observation.56 Garland-Thomson, referencing “the concept 
of the norm that Foucault finds emerging in the eighteenth century”, discusses the 
simultaneous characterisation of difference as pathological deviance and cultural curiosity, 
each the foil of the modern subject.57 Although Foucault seldom mentions disability 
explicitly, according to Garland-Thomson,  
 
we can nevertheless extrapolate from Foucault’s theory that the modern social identity of 
‘disabled’ emerged from the shifts he charts and that it arose in tandem with its opposite: the 
abstract, self-possessed, autonomous individual.58 
 
Garland-Thomson focuses on the relation between statistical and social norms as articulated 
upon identities, rather than the shifting epistemological concepts of the norm (as 
individual, qualitative, and internal, or collective and statistical) that appear in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.59 Other DS analyses of the norm articulate histories of 
epistemic concepts to make similar ontological claims about the relationship between 
norms and social exclusion. In his account of the history of the bell curve, an epistemic 
object of nineteenth-century statistics and eugenics, Lennard Davis argues that the norm is 
a rather recent concept and differentiates it from ideal, a seventeenth-century concept that 
describes standards of universal beauty that date back to antiquity.60 Davis uses this 
distinction between norm and ideal to trace the appearance of normalcy in nineteenth-
century literature and culture and demonstrate the social ramifications of statistical and 
scientific positivism. Whereas some DS works assume a unity of moral and natural ideals 
with the statistical norm, an imprecise slippage that is pervasive in critiques of 
normalisation, Davis explores the ideological basis of norms and the practice of statistics in 
the definition of desirable embodiments, differentiating the functions of statistical averages 
from “societies with the concept of an ideal, in which all people have a non-ideal status.”61 
Although Davis dwells in the nineteenth century, using it as evidence of how the norm 
functions in contemporary society, the epistemological functions of the norm, beyond their 
articulation within statistics and eugenics, drop out of his analysis in favor of discussions of 
aesthetic and bodily norms within literature. Thus, for my purposes, this account needs to 
be updated to reflect more of the history of moral, medical, and social thought that serves 
as conditions of possibility for the norm and normalisation.  
The epistemological modes described above betray the disciplinary concentration of 
DS theory (rather than empirical scholarship) in literary scholarship, where epistemology 
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occurs through poststructuralist critiques of language and cultural representations, and—to 
a more limited extent—in the social sciences, which focus on altering the epistemic 
authority of knowing subjects, rather than mapping the epistemic terrain of systems of 
knowledge that include standards of justification, authority, or the thresholds for truth 
claims. This methodological point hinges on differences in focus, scale, historicity, and 
epistemology, and highlights another habit of perception within DS: power (particularly 
biopower), rather than knowledge, is the overwhelming focus of DS scholarship on the 
power-knowledge nexus. As feminist philosopher of disability Shelley Tremain puts it, 
“The importance of critical work on bio-power (bio-politics) to analyses of disability cannot 
be overstated.”62 DS scholars focusing on power-knowledge tend to elaborate upon its role 
in shaping subjects and institutions, enabling governmentality, and defining worthy and 
unworthy lives. The field’s focus on power, often at the expense of a focus on systems of 
knowledge, is not surprising given its materialist origins and political conception of 
disability. In addition, this focus can be attributed to the overwhelming methodological and 
conceptual influence of Foucault’s later genealogical and ethical works, such as Discipline 
and Punish (1975) and The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 (1978) on DS’s understandings of 
subject-formation and bio-power.63 To be sure, the use of Foucault’s later works has been 
crucial to the articulation of DS’s critiques of normalisation. However, the methodological 
emphasis of these analyses is on historicising disability ontologies, rather than a concept of 
power-knowledge that can operate as historical epistemology.  
An exception that approximates historical epistemology is Tremain’s critique of the 
classic distinction within DS between impairment—construed as a natural, biological 
attribute—and disability—construed as a form of social disadvantage—in social model 
thought, a distinction in which, as she argues, biology is taken for granted as “value neutral 
and objective”,64 despite the fact that “technologies of normalization and the discourses that 
embody them […] have been complicit in the historical emergence of the category of 
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impairment and contribute to its persistence.”65 Within this framing, Tremain uses 
Hacking’s concept of “styles of reasoning” to discuss the ways that medical diagnosis 
becomes a tool for the exercise of power-knowledge by the “medical, juridical, and scientific 
authorities who employ it.”66 From Tremain’s account of styles of reasoning in stem cell 
technologies, we can observe how DS analyses of biopower, epistemic authority, and 
medical knowledge can operate as historical epistemologies if they use epistemological 
concepts and tools to map systems of knowledge and epistemic claims, in addition to the 
ways that they (already) work as historical ontologies.  
As a field of knowledge, then, the models framework has performed the crucial 
labor of differentiating disability—as a discursive artifact of regimes of knowledge, 
differentiation, and control—from the positive knowledges, that is, knowledges that make 
claims to positivity, within the disciplines that produce these regimes. The development of 
the models framework has emerged as a foundation of the field of DS not from an attempt 
to chart the entire history of thinking about disability, but rather from the social model 
itself, a model that emerged from activist work based on the rejection of medical authority 
and the promotion of disability independence. To be sure, these aspects of the social model 
have been invaluable to the development of DS as a field outside of medical discourses. 
And yet, the conceptual separations that underlie the DS models framework reveal that 
ontology67 and subjectification68 have largely eclipsed questions of historical epistemology 
and archaeology.69 These questions rely upon Foucault’s later works, where he frames them 
as external characteristics of a discourse (institutions, relations between societal agents, 
other discourses), rather than as internal to it (“the techniques for determining objects”, 
“the refinement and adjustment of concepts”, and “the accumulation of data”).70 That DS 
has turned away from archaeology explains why critiques of the medical model within the 
field center around the institution of medicine and its claims of authority, rather than on the 
articulation of knowledge-claims and techniques of cure within a broader framework of 
knowledge about disability. I submit that there is another Foucault, a Foucault whose 
historical, epistemological, and methodological insights are eclipsed by this overwhelming 
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focus on power and subjection as articulated through the institutions of medicine and law. 
To reveal this Foucault, I now turn to elaborate concepts that should be used to articulate an 
historical epistemology of disability that draws upon History of Madness.  
 
Reading the Archaeology of Cure in History of Madness  
Foucault’s History of Madness (1961), the full text of which was only translated into English 
in 2006, traces the split between reason and unreason in the classical age, a period 
beginning in the late seventeenth century and ending in the eighteenth century, roughly 
from Descartes to Kant. History of Madness speaks to many of DS’s most pressing concerns, 
including the social and historical contexts under which categories of disease and difference 
emerge, the construction of geographies and locations of disability, and the relationships 
between moral, medical, and social treatments of disabled people. Although History of 
Madness is usually discussed for its insights into the split between reason and unreason and 
the related spatialisation of madness in the classical age’s Great Confinement (insights that 
dominate the abridged version, Madness and Civilization [1964]),71 the book is also an 
archaeology of cure, told through the conditions under which positive medicine and 
psychiatry eventually emerge by carrying traces of moral epistemologies and cosmologies 
into the articulation of scientific standards of objectivity—a story that is simply not 
included in the abridged 1964 text. This latter point makes History of Madness especially 
useful as a guide to what historical epistemology and archaeology can do to address some 
of the conceptual and empirical omissions that I have identified as characteristic of DS’s 
habits of perception. Although the DS models framework has abundantly proven the 
persistence of the social in medical constructions of disability, the role of moral constructions 
in medical and social understandings has been largely ignored. What I show in this section 
is that DS should take History of Madness seriously in order to approach a more complex 
archaeological rendering of its concepts of cure and normalisation than is available in 
Foucault’s later genealogical and ethical works.72   
Even before Foucault considered the effects of epistemic regimes on power, as 
articulated through the circulation of discourses, classifications, and institutions, his 
archaeological method worked to reveal the mechanisms of epistemological shifts within 
regimes of truth that underlie social and material structures. As he reflected in a 1977 
interview, “When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about, 
in Madness and Civilization or The Birth of the Clinic, but power.”73 Thus, although Foucault 
later takes up questions of discourse and power in, for example, History of Sexuality, Volume 
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1, his archaeological approach in History of Madness introduces a broader field of figures, 
concepts, materialities, and experiences in order to discuss the epistemic workings of moral 
frames. My critical maneuver in this section echoes feminist and queer theorist Lynne 
Huffer’s claim that “When we don’t read Madness, we miss an important story about 
sexuality that links the apotheosis of reason and the objectifying gaze of science with what 
Foucault called bourgeois structures of moral exclusion.”74 Huffer elaborates upon History 
of Madness to develop queer theory, a field that (like DS) orients itself around questions of 
disqualification that occur along the axes of normal and pathological. I elaborate upon this 
point about the important narratives that reside in History of Madness, but are omitted from 
Madness and Civilization, in order to develop an historical epistemology of scientific and 
moral framings of disability.  
I want to emphasize, first of all, that questions of historical and epistemological 
method are crucial to Foucault’s particular account of the concept of cure. Rather than put 
knowledge only in the service of discussions of power, this account foregrounds 
epistemology. With respect to Foucault’s method in History of Madness, Huffer, who is 
particularly interested in Foucault’s concept of “eventualization”, or the “bringing to light 
of ‘ruptures of evidence’”,75 argues that one of his primary methodological contributions is 
the notion of disruption or partage in the flow of history, of appearance and disappearance, 
and of “doubling” as a game of truth.76 Whereas the models framework relies upon 
historical passages between the moral, medical, and social definitions of disability, for 
Foucault, rupture  
 
is not an undifferentiated interval—even a momentary one—between two manifest phases; 
it is not a kind of lapsus without duration that separates two periods, and which deploys 
two heterogeneous stages on either side of a split; it is always a discontinuity specified by a 
number of direct transformations between two particular positivities.77 
 
Historical epistemologist Arnold Davidson clarifies that archaeology, which is not only 
about rupture as a form of partage or splitting, also “makes possible the discovery of new 
continuities overlooked because of a surface appearance of discontinuity.”78 All of these 
accounts echo Georges Canguilhem’s notion of a “recursive method” of studying 
epistemological breaks.79 In Ideology and Rationality in the History of the Life Sciences, 
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Canguilhem clarifies the status of the epistemological break (a concept that we observed 
earlier in the models framework): 
 
Often the historian in search of a major watershed is tempted to follow Kant in assuming 
that science begins with a flash of insight, a work of genius. Frequently the effects of that 
flash are said to be all-embracing, affecting the whole of a scientist’s work. But the reality is 
different. Even within one man’s work we often find a series of fundamental or partial 
insights rather than a single dramatic break. A theory is woven of many strands, some of 
which may be quite new while others are borrowed from older fabrics.80 
 
We can glean from Canguilhem’s critique of the notion of a flash of insight that the 
conditions of possibility for epistemic shifts do not occur suddenly, but rather appear and 
re-appear, recursively double back, and shift out of intelligibility.81 Foucault’s account, 
rather than characterise the shifts between the moral, medical, and social models as a linear 
and continuous movement of clean breaks, replacements, or progressions, demonstrates the 
immanence of signs and their underlying values and functions within the games of truth.  
Whereas the DS models framework treats the categories of moral, medical, and social, or 
post-positivist, as natural and historically stable categories, Foucault’s History of Madness 
problematises all of these concepts by tracing their relationships within a broader grid of 
intelligibility. Foucault shows that historically, madness moves not as a linear teleology, but 
as a series of partage or divisions that produce and reveal emerging structures of 
knowledge. In the introduction to the English translation, Jean Khalfa writes, “Foucault’s 
target here is not scientific truth itself but the claims to scientificity of disciplines which take 
as natural an object that they have in fact shaped in ways and for reasons that are often 
largely exterior to the object itself.”82 What eventually emerges as a positive or scientific 
notion of madness, for Foucault, is not a displacement, but rather “a reification of a magical 
type […] starting out from a transparently clear moral framework which was slowly 
forgotten as positivism imposed its myth of scientific objectivity.”83 This reappearance is 
articulated through an historical epistemological narrative. Whereas the Renaissance 
conception of madness revolves around a notion of wisdom, morality, and nature, in the 
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classical age madness becomes defined by the separation of reason and unreason, 
producing institutions of segregation and confinement.84 Due to the Great Confinement of 
the classical age, it becomes possible to observe and control madness, which emerges as an 
object of the scientific gaze even before the emergence of medicine.  
From this broad narrative, we can excavate a more subtle narrative about the shifts 
and ruptures in procedures of treatment, and their attendant relationship to questions of 
natural ideals, statistical norms, and the social and material processes of normalization. 
Cure, in History of Madness, operates as a vector of power-knowledge driving the 
articulation of madness. Mining History of Madness, we find the persistence of a concept of 
cure, a technique and concept that is especially fruitful for Foucault, as it carries multiple 
connotations, from moral cure for the soul to therapeutic cure for the body. In the 2006 
translation, the English word, “cure” appears as the translation for two French terms: cure 
and guérison. The former (cure) has strong religious connotations, as curé is a priest who 
administers the cure of souls, whereas the latter (guérison) has medical (but not necessarily 
scientific) connotations, such as the healing and rehabilitation of the body.85 The ways that 
Foucault uses each term reveal the shifts and recursions that occur between moral and 
medical cures, as well as the persistence of a broader notion of restoration to health across 
definitions of cure.  
Beneath his narrative about shifts in madness that belong to or are radically outside 
of nature, Foucault traces a shift in the treatment of madness, from procedures of panacea (a 
universal remedy or “cure-all” prescribed in medieval humourist and alchemical medicine) 
to procedures of moral and therapeutic cure in the later classical age, a distinction that 
underlies a critical moment that fractures the classical experience of madness.86 In the 
Middle Ages, the “denouncing of madness became a general form of moral critique” even 
as in culture, madness “was denounced and defended, and proclaimed to be nearer to 
happiness and truth than reason itself.”87 Panacea, likewise, operated as a correction of the 
body’s departure from natural or cosmic balance.88 Foucault, rather than characterise the 
mechanism of panacea within medieval medicine as atavistic or based on religious 
superstition, reveals the ways in which the treatment of disease during this time operated 
within a broader epistemic practice of treatment, split into the panacea and “more localized 
remedies with more specific efficacies”—remedies tied to emerging understandings of 
treatment as working through “a complex system of correspondences” between treatments 
and parts of the body, rather than through cause and effect.89 Specific treatments for 
sickness were believed to exist in the “pharmacoepia” of “herbs and salts”, and “placed in a 
                                                          
84 We can observe the influence of Nietzsche’s “Genealogy of Morals” on this early work of Foucault’s, 
which carries the non-teleological historicity of morality throughout its narrative of cure. 
85 For the etymologies of these terms, see the entries for “cure” and “guérison” Trésor de la language 
française, http://atilf.atilf.fr/. 
86 Foucault, History of Madness, 297. 
87 Ibid., 13. 
88 Ibid., 300. 
89 Ibid. 
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discursive relation with the disorders of the organism that it was intended to remedy.”90 
The rational ordering of the pharmacoepia, then, predated any system of formal botanical 
science or medicine that could describe the mechanisms of correspondence between herbs 
and the resolution of illness. The panacea, as a remedy that targeted the health of the whole 
body (rather than a pathogen, disease, or other causal factor), existed in tension with these 
remedies, though both reflected an understanding of the body as in correspondence with 
and as a microcosm of nature (or, as in the case of illness, in violation of nature). 
A moral impetus to adhere to natural ideals infused these medieval treatments. In 
the panacea and the parallel system of localised remedies, Foucault locates an historical 
precedent for the normalising function of medicine—the restoration of the body to a prior 
state, and a notion of a desired bodily state as evidenced by an order much broader than the 
individual body itself. The panacea “is not general in itself, but rather inserts itself into the 
most general forms of functioning of the organism.”91 As opposed to localised remedies, 
applied to specific organs, the panacea could restore the body to balance and harmony, 
putting it back in line with the order of nature and the cosmos. Here Foucault locates 
another condition of possibility for what would later be characterised as pathology: the 
creation of a binary between nature and its outside: “in the panacea, it is nature herself that 
acts, effacing all that belongs to counter-nature.”92 The distinction between nature and 
counter-nature thus underlies a moral understanding of techniques of cure, under which 
individual bodies can be aligned with nature or fall radically outside of it, and treatment 
can either address the cosmic imbalances that cause states of un-health (as in the panacea) 
or operate according to the accumulated herbal or mineral knowledge of healers.  
The life of the panacea shifts again in the Renaissance, “where madness was linked 
to a whole selection of dramas and cosmic cycles” that persisted in the classical age with 
“the reinterpretation of some very ancient themes.”93 In the shift from madness as wisdom 
to the split between reason and unreason, the classical age retains the vector of madness as 
articulated through a relationship to nature and the morality of the soul: “the influence of 
the moon, or the widespread conviction that climate had a direct influence on the nature 
and quality of the animal spirits, and consequently on the nervous system, the imagination, 
the passions and all sicknesses of the soul.”94 Likewise, moral and imaginary themes persist 
in the use of human body parts and healing stones and crystals, “flying in the face of most 
medical concepts” of the classical age and destabilising the unity of medical knowledge 
with the technique of cure.95  
                                                          
90 Ibid. Here, Foucault seems to be referring to the “doctrine of signatures”, according to which plants 
resemble the parts of the body they intend to heal. 
91 Ibid., 298. 
92 Ibid., 297. 
93 Ibid., 364. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid., 302. 
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Nature, as a moral theme, persists even through a shift, in the classical age, from the 
body as microcosm of the universe that obeyed the rules of nature to what in the nineteenth 
century would be called the “milieu”,96 a broader context for the functioning and 
homeostasis of the organism, and a precursor to statistical and social conceptions of normal 
and pathological. In the conditions of possibility for the elaboration of milieu, we also find 
precedents for a later notion of statistical aberrance or abnormalcy: madness as difference 
from the operations of its surroundings, as well as from moral nature. It was this 
understanding of madness that, in the classical age, “gave full meaning to the notion of the 
cure [cure].”97 That Foucault uses cure (rather than guérison) in this context turns the 
narrative of scientific and biomedical progression on its head, for it signifies the way that a 
technique that was an “old idea […] took on new importance in that it gradually replaced 
the idea of the panacea.”98 As cure begins to eclipse panacea, “the purpose of [which] was to 
suppress all illness”, therapeutic cure locates health in “suppress[ing] the whole illness.”99 
Panacea is also eclipsed in eighteenth-century therapeutics (rather than eliminated) as cure 
becomes linked to a “space of generalized abstraction.”100 The effect of this eclipse is not 
that medical cure is suddenly discovered in a radical break between scientificity and moral 
notions of cure, or that medical cure replaces moral techniques of cure, but rather that cure 
begins to formalise knowledge about illness, a category that appears natural or pre-existing 
despite its historicity:  
 
The different phases of the cure were therefore to be articulated around the elements that 
constituted the sickness. From this point onwards, sickness began to be perceived as a 
natural unity, which automatically defined the logic of the prescription and described its 
own development. […] Furthermore, a cure was to pay attention to its own effects, 
compensate, correct and alter itself according to the different stages of the improvement, and 
even contradict itself if the nature of the illness and the temporary effect that it produced 
demanded it. As well as being a practice, all cures [cure] were therefore a spontaneous 
reflection on the cure [guérison] itself and on illness, and on the relation between the two.101 
 
It follows, then, that the epistemic function of (moral) cure was to introduce 
epistemologisation into practices that were otherwise disqualified from scientific 
rationalization (for instance, the herbal pharmacoepia). The supposed unity of medical 
sickness and cure infused the classical age’s treatment of madness as split from reason and 
therefore confineable. We observe this infusion, this unity, in the way that madness and 
                                                          
96 Ibid., 365. 
97 Ibid., 306. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid.; emphasis in Foucault. As an archaeological concept, “eclipse” indicates the persistence below a 
threshold of intelligibility. Foucault invokes the imagery of eclipse to discuss the splitting of madness in 
the sixteenth century into tragedy and “critical consciousness”, and the resulting intelligibilities and 
intelligibilities this split produces (Ibid., 25). 
100 Ibid., 300. 
101 Ibid., 306-07. 
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criminality share confinement, a technique that is both the repression of freedom102 and a 
curative procedure with moral valences:  
 
Madness found itself side by side with sin, and it is perhaps from there that stems the 
immemorial linking of unreason and guilt […] which doctors discover as a truth of nature. 
[…] It is strange that rationalism authorized this confusion between [moral] punishment and 
[medical] remedies, this quasi-identity between the act of punishment and the act that cures 
[guérit]. It supposes a certain treatment at the junction of medicine and morality that was 
both an anticipation of the torments of eternal damnation and an attempt to bring [return 
(rétablissement)] the patient back to health. The key element is the ruse in medical reasoning 
that does good while inflicting pain.103  
 
We can observe here, too, how moral reasoning becomes a mechanism for medicine to 
exercise power in a punitive capacity. This point makes it all the more crucial to understand 
how the concepts of moral and medical cure themselves operated around any body 
characterised as embodying difference.  
It follows that, contrary to the insistence of scholars such as Stiker, Garland-
Thomson, and Bill Hughes104 that Foucault did not write about physical disability, the 
classical age assumed a natural unity of bodily treatment and moral cure, or the restoration 
of health as a return to moral nature. In fact, physical disability appears throughout the text 
as a vector that drives the history of madness. Foucault notes the shifting notions of 
blindness as evidence of or departure from reason, eventually becoming, in the classical 
age, the physical verification of a supposedly sinful soul.105 Furthermore, throughout the 
text, he historicises the association of blindness with epistemic disqualification, not 
endorsing this position, but rather using its appearance to illustrate the classical age’s 
conception of reason as related to the authority of ocularcentric perception.106 In the 
transition to nineteenth-century medicine, blindness as evidence of madness falls away, 
while the psychological evidence of madness becomes objectively viewable as hysteria.107 
Insofar as in positive psychiatry madness becomes the “psychological effect of a moral 
fault”,108 the moral model persists when medicine crosses the threshold of medical 
formalization.  
Thus, it becomes similarly important to consider the epistemic status of physicians 
whose role in the medical model is understood to be paramount in the terms of the models 
framework. The archaeology of cure provides an historical and epistemological perspective 
                                                          
102 Ibid., 77. 
103 Ibid., 86. 
104 Bill Hughes, “What Can a Foucauldian Analysis Contribute to Disability Theory?”, in Shelley Tremain 
(ed.), Foucault and the Government of Disability (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 80. 
105 Foucault, History of Madness, 295-296. 
106 Ibid., 241, 296, 349, 454, 461, and 499. 
107 Ibid., 295-96. 
108 Ibid., 296. 
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on the conditions of possibility for this contemporary feature of medicine. In the Great 
Confinement, Foucault explains,  
 
it was not medical thought that forced open the doors of the asylum, and if today doctors 
now reign in such places, it is not through any right of conquest resulting from the vital force 
of their philanthropy or their concern with scientific objectivity. It is because confinement 
itself slowly took on a therapeutic value, bringing a realignment of all the political and social 
gestures, and the moral and imaginary rituals that for more than a century had been used to 
ward off madness and unreason.109 
 
Foucault’s framing challenges the models framework’s association between scientificity (or, 
positivity) and biomedical authority. The (re)alignment of confinement with treatment—the 
doubling of panacea even as cure formally eclipses it—provides an epistemological 
qualifier to the notion of the physician’s epistemic authority. This notion, rather than 
represent the structure of scientific objectivity in toto, represents a type of knowledge-claim 
that the regime of the Great Confinement produces. A “whole technical corpus centred on 
curing, over which physicians […] had no control”110 emerged in the eighteenth century, 
giving epistemic authority over healing to non-medical experts.111 
The classical notion of cure becomes a mechanism for control precisely because 
institutions that fuse “moral treatment” with “therapeutic punishments” double the 
meaning of repressive power “as it cures [guérison] the body and purifies the soul.”112 To 
illustrate, eighteenth century water cures (or “cure by baths”113) for mania meant to cool 
and lubricate the humours.114 These cures revealed the ways in which the Renaissance 
association of water with the exile of madness,115 portrayed in the Stultifera Navis, had been 
eclipsed. Instead, water cure returned water to association with moral purification,116 with 
the administration of cold showers and bathing in the classical age acting as “violence [that] 
promised the rebirth of a baptism.”117 Another eighteenth-century technique of cure—
movement therapy—sought to restore the body into “harmony with the well-ordered 
mobility of the outside world.”118 In this regard, Foucault observes that movement therapy 
replicated the patterns of movement of the sea, which were deemed the “most natural, the 
                                                          
109 Ibid., 437. 
110 Ibid., 305. 
111 As historians of science have noted, even the notion of objectivity during the 17th and 18th centuries 
adhered to a standard of “truth-to-nature rather than objectivity”. See Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, 
Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2010), 58. 
112 Foucault, History of Madness, 87. 
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114 Ibid., 271. 
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most regular, and the most closely tied to the movement of the cosmos”, revealing the 
persistence of natural and moral themes of water in relation to madness, now split into 
exercise and bathing therapies.119  
When the cure does enter the realm of medical practice (the domain in which the DS 
models framework locates the workings of the normalising medical model), it becomes 
filtered through shifting thresholds of positivity within the emerging discipline of late 
nineteenth-century psychiatry. Foucault describes medical cure’s emergence not as the 
conquering of science and biomedicine over the uncertainty of moral therapeutics, but 
rather as the paradox of 
  
medical practice enter[ing] the uncertain domain of the quasi-miraculous just as the science 
of mental illness was trying to assume a sense of positivity. On the one hand madness is 
placed at a distance in an objective field where threats of unreason disappear; but at the 
same moment the madman and the doctor begin to form a strange sort of couple, an 
undivided unity where complicity is forged along very ancient lines.120 
 
In other words, the doctor/patient coupling doubles as a relation of knowledge and power 
within families, prisons, and the maintenance of social order precisely by maintaining a 
complicity with cure that predates positivity, but dwells in uncertainty. As Foucault later 
clarifies in the interview with which I begin this paper, nineteenth-century medicine 
consisted of “ill-founded, poorly established and unverified sets of knowledge. The 
harmfulness of medicine was judged in proportion to its non-scientificity.”121 Paradoxically, 
it is within this uncertain space of the convergence of order and epistemic framings that 
“the origins of the doctor’s power to cure were to be found;”122 they were not found within 
the space of positivity.  
 
From the Models Framework to the Archaeology of Cure  
Even before the clinic emerged as a space of the therapeutic gaze and experimental 
medicine, the practice of cure circulated in various realms of truth: it traveled between the 
positivity of emerging medical and psychiatric therapeutics and the moral knowledge of 
nature and its outside—knowledge carried historically through the practice of panacea. As 
a result, Foucault argues, the “great organizing structures of the experience of madness in 
the classical age penetrated even the empirical mechanisms of the cure.”123 Within these 
games of truth, even when medicine “acknowledges the impossibility of a cure”, it “wrap[s] 
up [its] knowledge in the norms of positivism”,124 while it addresses symptoms and shapes 
the visibility of difference to reflect the circulation of “political, legal, and economic” ideals 
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in society.125 The resulting relationship of power and knowledge created the conditions for 
the emergence of the clinic.  
The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception clarifies Foucault’s broader 
archaeological argument about the power-knowledge nexus within cure and normalisation, 
the unity of which is foundational to descriptions of the medical model. Whereas in History 
of Madness, Foucault traces the seed of the moral theme of the cure in the Middle Ages, in 
The Birth of the Clinic, he locates the historical structure of the clinic itself, albeit devoid of 
scientific significance, as emerging even before the eighteenth century notion of cure.126 
Even with the emergence of the clinic, Foucault argues,  
 
up to the end of the eighteenth century, medicine related much more to health than to 
normality; it did not begin by analyzing a ‘regular’ functioning of the organism and go on to 
seek where it had deviated. […] [I]t referred, rather, to qualities of vigor, suppleness, and 
fluidity, which were lost in illness and which it was the task of medicine to restore […] 
Nineteenth-century medicine, on the other hand, was regulated more in accordance with 
normality than with health […] When one spoke of the life of groups and societies, of the life 
of the race, or even of the ‘psychological life,’ one did not think first of the internal structure 
of the organized being, but of the medical bipolarity of the normal and the pathological.127 
 
These distinctions—between a focus on the internal health of the organism in relationship 
to its environmental milieu and the individual’s health relative to a statistical, normal 
population—are telling of the distinction between cure as restoration and normalisation as 
a polemical construct of statistical knowledge.128 What Foucault contributes to a broader 
historical field developed by Canguilhem and others, however, is an analysis of how 
eighteenth-century medicine, while not focused on normality in the statistical sense, 
nevertheless values the purification of imbalances in the body through the mechanical and 
restorative process of the cure.129 This point clarifies and lends support to the argument that 
the cure’s moral basis precedes its medicalisation and survives past it. As the above reading 
of History of Madness demonstrates, in the process of medicine fully eclipsing moral 
understandings of the natural, the cure and the clinic operate in the service of the 
restoration of the subject’s moral purification through the body. Foucault reveals that the 
cure precedes the clinic and normalisation itself. 
                                                          
125 Ibid., 172. 
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127 Ibid., 35; emphasis added. 
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Thus, cure is an unstable object of archaeological analysis, the excavation of which 
shifts into perception the meanings of disqualification, health, restoration, and treatment 
that carry from moral cure through medical normalisation and rehabilitation. Rather than 
take for granted the unity of the cure with the medical model, we should, with Foucault, 
observe that the practice of cure emerges long before any concept of objective science, 
positive medicine, medical pathology, eugenic norm, or embodied deviation 
(epistemological categories that underlie the medical model of disability). Traces of the 
moral model in positive medical cures fracture the supposed unity of medicine and the 
ideology of the cure. In turn, a re-appraisal of the meaning and practice of cure, as well as 
the circulation of truth claims around it, reveals that socially constructed biomedicine is in 
turn a moral construct, with implications for further conceptualisations of nature, 
difference, and ethics. My broader methodological argument, then, is that DS should turn 
away from the cause-and-effect, teleological narrative of the models framework and turn 
toward discussing what Foucault’s ideas of thresholds of knowledge, ruptured continuities, 
displacement, partage, and eclipse offer to critical disability scholarship.  
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